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We propose a utility consistent method of identifying the set of competitors that a product faces. 
We apply the method to the 1987 U.S. new automobile market. 
I. IWwduction 
A firm competes with other firms as each tries to sell its product(s) to the 
consumer. Much recent work in international trade theory is concerned with 
the degree of competition between these firms and how various policies 
interact with this competition. Surprisingly little attention has been focused 
on determining just which products compete with each other. Nonetheless, 
this question of ‘Who is the competition?’ is an important one. 
Consider the question in the context of a market with which most readers 
are familiar - the U.S. automobile market. Here we would ask which 
automobiles compete with one another. Economic policy implications 
abound. Does the Japanese voluntary export restraint on automobile exports 
to the United States help some U.S. auto manufacturers more than others? 
Would an oil import fee affect one firm relatively more adversely than other 
firms? Finally, will an import quota on Korean automobiles benefit domestic 
firms or are Japanese firms the prime beneficiaries? A necessary first step to 
answering all of these questions is identifying the competition. Also, the 
issues presented in the above set of questions are not unique to the 
automobile industry. A similar set of issues and questions arise in many 
other industries. 
*We are grateful to Avinash Dixit for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. We are also 
grateful for the insightful comments of three referees. This paper was substantially revised while 
Levinsohn was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for International Economic Studies, University 
of Stockholm. Me thanks the Institute for providing arll ideal work environment. 
22-1996/90/$X50 Q 1990, lishers 
200 J. Levinsohn and R. Feenstra, Identifying the competition 
This paper develops an empirical technique, informed by economic theory, 
which identifies the competition when products are multi-dimensionally 
differentiated. Section 2 briefly discusses previous approaches to this 
problem. Section 3 develops the theory behind our new methodology. 
Section 4 discusses how one would empirically implement the theory. Section 
5 provides an example of the technique. The methodology is used to identify 
the competitors of every 1987 model year automobile. Sensitivity analyses are 
also conducted. In section 6, potential problems with this new technique are 
discussed. We conclude with a brief discussion of possible applications of the 
methodology. 
2. Previous approaches to identifying the competition 
There have been two broad approaches to identifying the competition.’ 
In the international trade literature, the typical approach to identifying the 
competition is to simply assume that products are differentiated by country 
of origin. Two very informative examples of recent empirical work on 
automobile trade that take this approach are Dixit (1988) and Digby, Smith 
and Venables (1988). Sometimes referred to as the Armington assumption, 
this approach is easy to implement, often meshes nicely with theoretical 
models in international trade, yet is usually a gross oversimplification of 
reality. While country of origin may be a differentiating characteristic, it is 
seldom the sole or most important one. Indeed, with the current proliferation 
of direct foreign investment, even identifying the country of origin becomes 
problematic (i.e. Are Nissans made in the United Kingdom European or 
Japanese, and are Hondas made in Ohio American or Japanese products?). 
A second and often more satisfactory approach to identifying the compe- 
tition is found in empirical implementations of the Hotelling model of 
product differentiation. Here products are arranged along a line according to 
quality. Any one product has at most two competitors. The location of 
products along the quality spectrum is accomplished with a hedonic 
regression. Price is regressed on salient product characteristics and the 
predicted price is taken as a proxy for quality. A very nice paper that adopts 
this approach is Bresnahan ( 1981).2 In reality, products are multi- 
dimensionally differentiated and hence a given product may have more than 
two competitors. In the following sections we present a new technique for 
‘We note a third, p urely statistical, technique to identify competitors. This is cluster analysis, 
which is discussed in Dillon and Goldstein (1984) and applied in an international trade cor\t.ext 
by Pepall (1987). 
‘We note that this is only the first step in a much more complex analysis of departures from 
marginal cost pricing. An extension of Bresnahan’s complete analysis to a model with multi- 
dimensional product ditferentiation is the subiect of current research by the authors. 
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identifying competitors that allows for multi-dimensional product differentia- 
tion. This technique, like its predecessors, makes use of a hedonic regression. 
Whether firm A’s product competes with firm B’s product will depend 
upon the physical characteristics of the products and how consumers care 
about these characteristics. Let x =(x1, x2,. . . ,x,) be a vector of characteris- 
tics describing a product differentiated in n dimensions. RZ then is the space 
in which products are differentiated. The set of products available to the 
consumer is a discrete set {x,}, m = 1,. . . , AL3 0 = (O,, 8,, . . . , 0,) represents 
the vector of preference parameters for an individual. Different products have 
different x’s and different individuals have different 0’s. An individual’s 
utility is given by: 
where y is the quantity consumed of a numeraire good. Prices of the 
differentiated products are denoted by pm. It is assumed that each consumer 
buys only one unit of the good. Each consumer’s maximization problem can 
then be stated as: 
max U(x,, 0) - Pm. 
1srnsM 
(2) 
It will be convenient to introduce the idea of a consumer’s most preferred, 
or ideal, product [as in Lancaster (1979)]. In determining the ideal product, 
we hypothetically assume that all points in R’!,_ are 
This means that we must also specify hypothetical 
Prices of goods are related to the characteristics of 
assume that 
P=P(x), XER”+, 
with P(x,) = Pm.4 
A consume+ most preferred product, denoted by K* 
x* =argmax {0(x, 8) -P(x)). 
X20 
available as products. 
prices for all XE R”, . 
the goods. Hence we 
(3) 
is given by 
(4) I 
‘The set (x ) should also include alternatives to purchasing the differentiated product, such as 
keeping a use: version, In practice, we shall not include these alternatives as data. 
41n other w or d s, we are assuming that the price function (3) fits the price and characteristics 
data on the M models exactly. In practice, we expect that P, will differ from P(x,) by some 
error, as discussed in section 5. 
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The first-order condition implied Oy (4) is given by: 
aU(x*, 8) dP(xS) =-- 
ax b.x l (5) 
For many functional forms of (l), condition (5) may be inverted to solve 
for the unobservable taste parameters. s This implies a mapping between 
tastes and most preferred products given by: 
0 = Y(x*). (6) 
Suppose F(0) denotes the cumulative distribution function of consumers 
with taste parameters less than or equal to 0. Then we can use (6) to define 
the distribution of consumers over ideal products as G(x*) =F[Y(x*)]. We 
assume that the support of the distribution G is a convex set which includes 
all available models.6 
Now define, 
S(x, x*) = U(x, Y(x*)) - P(x). (7) 
Eq. (7) defines a surplus function S(x, x*). This function gives the surplus 
associated with product x when the ideal product is x*. Surplus is maximized 
at x=x*. Likewise, as x differs from x* in any of the n dimensions in which 
the products are differentiated, surplus declines.’ Eq. (7) also defines iso- 
surplus contours conditional on a most preferred product, x*. Surplus is 
constant along a contour and declines as contours become further from x*. 
The shape of these contours will depend upon the functional forms chosen 
for (1) and (3). 
Now the consumer’s problem, (2), may be restated as: 
‘From Gale and Nikaido (1965), a sufficient condition to globally invert (5) obtaining (6) is 
that the principal minors of UXe be positive for all x > 0 and 0 > 0. This will be satisfied by the 
functional form used in section 3. 
6This assumption is made to ensure that there exists at least one consumer with every relevant 
ideal variety. See also section 6. 
‘To see this, consider the second-order approximation S(x, x*) G S(x*, x*) + SX(x*, x*)(x -x*) + 
(1/2)(x -x*)‘SXX(x*, x*)(x -x*), where, in this footnote only, subscripts denote pjartial derivatives. 
From (5) and (7), we see that SJx*,x*) =0 and SXX(x*,x*) = [UXX(x*, 0) -F,,(x*)], which is 
negative definite from the second-order conditions for (4). (Note, though, that this is a local 
property only.) ft follows that S(x,x*) &J(x*,x*) +( 1/2)(x-x*)‘[U,,(x*,8)-P,,(x*)J(x-x*), 
where the latter term is negative for x+x*. 
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Fig. 1 
max S(x,, x*) = U(x, !P (x*)) - P,. 
l~;m~M 
(8) 
It is clear that (8) is simply a rewritten version of problem (2), in the sense 
that model m* will solve both problems if @ = !Y(x*). 
We propose the following definition of competitors. 
Definition. Products _I”r. and B are competitors if there exists x* ER”+ such 
that S(x,, x*) = S(X~, x*) 2 S(x,, x*), V models C. 
This definition states that if A and B are competitors, then there exists a 
consumer indifferent between A and B who prefers those two models to all 
other models. There are, though, an infinite number of ideal varieties, x*, 
that still leave S(X~, x*) =S(X~, x*). We need only find one point x* satisfying 
the above condition to call A and B competitors. 
Fig. 1 illustrates our definition. Points A, and C represent available 
products differentiated in characteristics x1 an 2. S1 represents the surplus 
contour of an individual with an ideal product X* who is indifferent between 
A and B (since A and B lie on the same iso-surplus contour), S2 represents 
the surplus contour of an individual with an ideal product x who is also 
indigerent between A and B. In fig. 1, models A and are competitors since 
S(x,, x*)[ = S(x,, x*)1 > S(x,, x*) as drawn. The fact th S(-&, x) e = S(%, M-3 < 
S(x,,x) means that a consumer with ideal product x woul 
rather than A or B. 
‘The above definition has several appealing qualities. T include: (a) 
in a otelling model, relations 
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the definition is symmetric (if A is a competitor of B, B is necesarily a 
competitor of A); and (c) the definition is equivalent to defining two products 
as competitors if and only if their cross-elasticity of demand is positive. This 
equivalence can be seen as follows.* 
Suppose that A and B are competitors by the above definition. Then there 
is a consumer with ideal variety x9 such that S(x,,x*) = S(X~,X*) 2x,, x*) for 
all models C. Ignoring border ine cases, treat the latter inequality as strict. 
Now raise the price of model ount. This increases PB and 
lowers S(xa9x*) in (S).’ For a rease in P,, we will then 
have S(x,,, x*) > S( x,, x* nsumer with ideal x* will 
now purchase model s, when prod are competitors by our 
definition, a slight increase in shift consumers towards 
purchasing the other. It follo elasticity of demand is 
positive. Conversely, if two products are not titors by our definition, 
then there are no consume em, and the cross-price 
elasticity of demand is zero. 
4. Implementing 
The first step 
tional forms on 
there is not a 
functional forms 
the theory 
towards implementing the theory requires imposing func- 
the utility function (I) and on the price function (3). While 
clearly right or wrong functional form for utility, some 
are better than others. One requirement is that the number 
of taste parameters, @iv equal the number of characteristics, xi. In addition, it 
is desirable to be able to vary the concavity of the utility function in a 
parametric manner. These goals are achieved by using a constant elasticity of 
substitution functional form: 
U(x,O)= i $(x;-1). 
i= 1 
(9) 
The elasticity of substitution between characteristics is 0 = l/( l-6) with 
Ss l.‘O 
It will be important for empirical work that the price function (3) fit the 
data well. With this requirement in mind, empirical work often imposes (or 
tests) a log-linear functional form on the price function. Hence: 
P(x) = exp (a + p’x), (10) 
*A rigorous definition of demand, and its relation to the set of competitors for each product, 
is provided in Feenstra and Levinsohn (1989). 
‘When raising P, in (8), we hold the function Y(x*) constant. 
“AS 6-4, the utility function becomes U(x, 0) =‘j’S=, Oi In xi. 
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where a and /I = (&, &, . . . , &) > 0 are parameters. 
Given these functional forms, the mapping (6) between tastes and most 
preferred products becomes: 
ei =(Xi*)l -‘pi exp (pX* + a). 
The surplus function is: 
S(x,x*)=exp(/b*+a) $ ~(~~)~-~(x~-l)-exp(/?‘x+a). 
i = (12) 
The iso-surplus contours implicitly defined by (12) resemble ellipsoids but are 
not symmetric. Rather, they are slightly egg-shaped. 
Before the surplus function can be used to identify competitors, it must 
first be parameterized. We will obtain estimates of the j$‘s by estimating (the 
log of) (10). The parameter S relating to the elasticity 0: substitution between 
characteristics is simply posited. The robustness of results to the choice of S 
is investigated in subsequent sensitivity analyses. The characteristics of an 
available model, the xI)s, are data. 
Note that the definition of competitors, using (12), is invariant to the units 
in which characteristics are measured. Suppose, for example, that units of 
measurement were redefined such that xi is now scaled by a factor il. This 
implies that the /? estimated from (10) is multiplied by l/L Then simple 
calculations show that the surplus function becomes: 
S(Ax,ilx*)=exp(/-?‘x*+a) il f(xf)‘-a(xf-P)-exp(px+a). ’ (12) 
i = 
It is straightforward to show that (12) and (12’) lead to identical sets of 
competitors. The reason is that when making the comparison, S(x,,x*) = 
S(X~, x*) zS(x,,x*), as in our definition. The term involving 1-’ in (12’) will 
cancel out. The remaining terms in (12’) are identical to those in (12), so 
identical sets of competitors are obtained. 
Given two potential competitors, products A and B, the next step is to 
identify the consumers with preferences 0, and hence a most preferred 
product x* such that S(x,,x*) = S(xb, x*). With x* identified, the surplus 
function is fully parameterized. As discussed in the previous section, there are 
an infinite number or’ points x* such that S(X~,X*) = S(x,, x*), and in principle 
we need to check each of them to see whether our definition holds. 






practice, we shall simplify the task by only considering points x* such that 
X* =42x, +( 1 - s2)x,, with 0s Szs 1. That is, we restrict attention to ideal 
products x* which lie on a line segment between X, and xb. In many cases, 
such as illustrated in fig. 1, this approach will correctly identify whether A 
and B are competitors. However, since we have restricted the search for x*, it 
is certainly possible that we will omit some models as competitors, as 
illustrated in fig. 2. 
Fig. 2 is the same as fig. 1, except that the position of model C has 
changed. Ideal product x* satisfies S(x,, x*) = S(x,, x*) and x* = rRx, + 
I- 52)x,. Since S(X~, x*) [ = S(xb, x*)] < S(x,, x*), we would reject models A 
and B as competitors by only considering x* lying on a line segment lying 
between x, and x(,. However, we also see that S(x,, X) [ = S(xb, x)] > S(x,, x), so 
models A and B are competitors by our definition. Summing up, our method 
can reject models as competitors when they really are, but it clearly can 
never accept models as competitors when they are not. In section 6 we 
discuss how serious this limitation may be. 
With many models A, B, C, D, . . . available, we calcuiate x* on a line 
segment between each two models with equal surplus obtairr- 1 from the two. 
We then check whether greater surplus is obtained from any other model. If 
so, then the models are (possibly incorrectly) rejected as competitors; if not 
the two models are accepted as competitors. The results from this calculation 
are reported next. 
n this section we i entify the corn etitors to the 136 models which make 
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up the 1987 new car market in the United States.’ 1 The automobile market 
provides an especially nice test of our methodology. It is a market with 
which most readers are familiar, hence the plausibility of our results is 
readily examined. It is also a market with many differentiated products and 
plentiful data. 
We first choose the dimensions in which products are differentiated. 
were available on 12 characteristics of every model.’ 2 We choose the most 
relevant characteristics by applying nested hypothesis testing to the OLS 
estimation of the price function (10). We address possible problems with the 
use of nested hypothesis testing in the sensitivity ana!yses. 
The estimated price function is 
LOGPRICE= -0.685+0.000119WT+0.121CARB1 +O.O030TORQ 
(0.519) (0.000059) (0.051) (0.0007) 
+O.l56PSI +0.407AIRI+0.252FORI+53.81NVHT, 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.045) (25.6) 
R2 = 0.794, 136 observations. (13) 
Of the 12 differentiating characteristics on which data were available, nested 
hypothesis testing resulted in a characteristics space differentiated in seven 
dimensions. These are weight of the vehicle (WT), engine torque (TORQ), the 
inverse of the height of the vehicle (ZNVHT), whether the auto had fuel 
injection (CARBI), air conditioning (AI RI), and power steering (PSI) as 
standard equipment, and whether the auto was foreign (FORI)? All 
variables refer to the base model of a product. 
The use of binary variables in the context of identifying competition 
deserves special note. We view the variables PSI and AlRl as proxies for 
increasing degrees of luxury. Similarly, the FOR1 may proxy for perceived 
quality or longevity. In these contexts, a most preferred product may well 
’ ‘When a model is produced by two divisions of the same corporation and the models only 
differ cosmetically, such as the Ford Escort and the Mercury Lynx, only one of the models is 
used in the sample. 
12Please refer to the data appendix for a complete description of the data set. 
‘“The dummy variables CARBI, PSI, and AIRI took the value of 2 if the feature was 
standard equipment and 1 if not. FORI took the value of 2 if the auto was produced abroad 
and 1 if domestically produced. (Models which were produced both in the United States and 
abroad are considered foreign models.) This dJfers from the usual O-l convention, but is 
necessary since some dummy variables line raised to negative powers in calculating the surplus 
function. This departure from convention only changes the constant in the regression and has no 
effect on the results. 
208 9. L,wirw+ and R. Feenstra, Identifyin the competition 
have a value for these variables that is between the all-or-nothing choice 
imposed by available products. 
Characteristics such as horsepower and miles per gallon of gasoline, items 
many consumers deem important, were not stat’stically signifkant14 in the 
price function. This is because these characteristics are spanned by linear 
combinations of included variables such as weight, inverse of height, and 
torque. Including the statistically insignificant characteristic of the price 
function (13) would have posed two problems. First, inclusion would have 
induced multicollinearity. TRis is a relatively minor problem as estimates are 
still unbiased, and we OI& mice the parameter estimates, not their estimated 
standard errors, in the surplus function? More importantly, each character- 
istic included in the price function represents a dimension in which one must 
search for potential competitors. With too many characteristics, the search 
bei omes computationally burdensome. 
Estimated coefficients in the price function are used to parameterize the 
surplus function (12). The only unidentified parameter in the surplus function 
is 6 which is related to the elasticity of substitution between characteristics. 
We are unable to econometrically identify S with our data. Rather, we set 6 
equal to a variety of plausible values and test the robustness of our results? 
Setting 6= - 3 for the base case scenario, competitors to every 1987 
automobile model were identified using the procedure described above. The 
results are given in table 1. Table 1 tells one, for example, that model 2, the 
Acura Legend, has as competitors models: 4 - the Alfa Romeo Milano, 8 - 
the Sterling, 40 - the Nissan Maxima, and 69 - the Volvo 740. The number 
of competitors to a model varies fro&m one (the Chevrolet Corvette) to sixteen 
(the Renault Medallion). With few exceptions, the results accord well with 
intuition. 
If only because the theoretical literature so often assumes product 
differentiation only by country of origin, it is worth noting that the results in 
table 1 are broadly inconsistent with this assumption. For example, two 
Japanese products, the Acura Legend and the Toyota Tercel, do not have a 
single competitor in common. Rather, the Legend’s competitcrs are fairly 
large powerful European models, while the small Tercel’s competitors are all 
Japanese models. 
The results in table 1 are the product of several rather ad hoc assumptions 
made in order to empirically implement our theory. It would be helpful to 
test whether the results obtained are robust to these assumptions. In this 
*4’Statistically significant’ refers to an estimate being statistically significantly different from 
zero at the 95 percent level. 
“Were multicollinearity too severe, though, the design matrix might be so ill-conditioned th;’ 
inversion difficulties arise. In addition, negative estimated values for pi can lead the surplus 
function (12) to violate the properties in footnote 5. 
‘@This procedure was used in a different context by Feenstra (1988). Note that lower 
ative) values for S lead to utility surplus functions which arc more concave. 






















































Base case results. 



















































5 21 I’4 38 39 41 53 66 67 91 116 
4 8 40 69 
19 26 27 41 54 59 128 
2 10 24 28 42 
1 6 19 38 39 41 57 59 66 81 
5 36 59 63 
48 49 63 
2 60 
17 38 54 58 135 
4 15 30 70 79 
29 40 60 70 
29 61 83 86 111 112 113 
18 50 55 
16 17 25 55 56 
10 27 43 59 77 92 131 
14 32 55 
9 14 31 64 116 135 
13 50 55 71 87 
3 5 35 41 58 59 66 
22 51 87 115 
1 34 39 47 66 114 124 
18 20 33 56 115 
25 32 55 
4 28 36 44 
14 23 51 56 62 65 114 
3 39 47 52 53 66 67 73 88 101 129 
3 15 57 59 128 
4 24 36 69 
11 12 30 61 70 80 84 86 122 
10 29 37 46 61 70 110 
17 52 56 62 116 135 
16 23 51 
22 56 115 
21 1 35 41 66 
19 34 38 58 
6 24 28 44 45 63 69 
30 42 46 61 
5 9 35 1 54 58 116 
5 21 26 1 41 47 57 66 91 103 109 
2 11 60 70 
3 5 19 34 39 1 57 59 
4 37 60 61 
15 47 48 57 89 90 96 109 119 133 
24 36 45 
36 44 
30 37 79 86 110 
5 21 26 39 43 57 66 75 T’G 96 103 108 1 118 119 
7 43 57 63 
7 68 69 
13 18 11 




































































































20 25 32 56 
26 31 1 53 62 66 67 88 116 129 
26 52 1 64 116 
3 9 38 64 116 
13 14 16 18 23 
14 25 33 51 114 
5 27 39 41 43 47 48 59 96 102 108 109 
5 9 19 35 38 54 
3 5 6 15 19 27 41 57 89 102 
8 11 40 42 61 
12 29 30 37 42 60 86 123 
25 31 52 65 67 114 116 135 
6 7 36 48 
17 53 54 116 
25 62 66 67 106 114 
5 19 21 26 39 47 52 65 1 67 91 107 136 
26 52 62 65 66 1 73 88 114 116 ‘17 
49 69 
2 28 36 49 68 131 
10 11 29 30 40 
18 50 
82 92 93 105 132 
26 67 91 117 
75 118 
47 74 76 96 102 108 118 130 
47 75 96 119 133 
15 89 124 132 
29 79 81 92 93 110 121 131 
10 46 78 81 89 110 130 
29 84 110 123 
5 78 79 89 91 102 103 108 135 
72 85 127 134 
12 86 111 113 127 
29 80 122 123 
82 122 
12 29 46 61 83 110 111 123 127 
18 20 115 135 
26 52 67 91 98 99 106 117 129 135 136 
43 59 68 69 77 79 81 92 102 130 131 133 
43 47 119 133 
39 66 73 81 88 1 107 129 136 
15 72 78 93 131 
72 92 105 121 134 
‘,ll 
81 100 126 
43 47 57 75 76 108 109 119 
105 
88 99 101 106 114 115 117 129 
77 88 98 114 124 
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Model Model 
no. name 
Table 1 (continued) 










































































47 81 95 118 125 
26 98 107 128 129 
57 59 75 81 89 108 128 
39 47 81 104 108 109 119 
47 81 103 126 
72 82 83 86 93 97 127 
6.t 88 98 115 117 135 
66 81 91 101 125 129 136 
47 57 75 81 96 102 103 
39 43 47 57 96 103 119 
29 30 46 78 79 80 86 121 
12 83 86 94 113 127 
12 113 
12 83 111 112 
21 25 56 62 65 98 99 
20 22 87 98 106 135 
17 31 38 52 53 54 64 1 136 
67 73 88 91 98 106 
47 74 75 108 125 
43 47 76 90 96 103 109 
132 
29 78 93 110 134 
29 84 85 134 
61 80 84 86 
21 77 88 99 114 129 
;I 1; 81 100 107 118 
72 82 83 86 93 105 
3 27 101 102 129 
26 52 88 91 98 101 107 124 128 136 
75 79 89 133 
15 69 78 81 89 92 
15 72 77 120 
43 47 76 89 90 130 
29 82 93 121 122 
9 17 31 81 87 88 106 115 
66 88 91 107 116 129 
context, Learner (1985) has argued persuasively for sitivity analysis. 
types of sensitivity analysis were performed to the the robustness of the 
results in table 1. First, 6 was set equal to - 1.0 is 
experiment varies the degree of concavity of the u e, 
the analysis was repeated. 
Second, the order in which hypotheses 
hypothesis testing may affect the outcome 
slightly changing the criteria used for the s 
and changing the order of the nested hypothesis tests, 
hedonic regression that includes 
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Table 2 
Sensitivity analyses: S = a summary statistic 
for competing models. 
Base case 










nizing this, we used engine horsepower in the price function instead of using 
torque, and repeated the analysis. 
Robustness of the results depends on the question being posed. If one is 
solely interested in whether model A competes with model B, one finds that 
about three out of every four competitors remain when either S changes or 
HP is used. On the other hand, one may wish to characterize aspects of the 
entire group of competitors. One may wish to ~6:~ for example, what 
happens to the average price of a model’s competitors. 
There are several plausible statistics that would adequately represent how 
stable the set of competitors that a model faces is. Denote the set of 
competitors that model m faces by I, with N, elements. One such summary 
statistic, S, is: 
s l M =- xL (l/N,) C”& p, M m=l 1 pm ’ (14) 
The mean price of a model’s competitors is in the numerator of the term in 
brackets. This mean is normalized by the model’s own price. Finally, the 
term in brackets is averaged over all models. For example, if S= 1.0, on 
average a model has the same price as its competitors. In table 2 we show 
how this summary statistic varies as we vary 6 and replace torque with 
horsepower. The robustness of the results is illustrated by how little S varies 
across sensitivity analyses. Given the standard deviation of S reported in the 
second column of the table, it is clear that the results are quite robust (if one 
cares about the average price rf a model’s competitors).” 
In general, then, if one wishes only to determine if model X is a competitor 
of model Y, answers may change with specification changes. If, on the other 
hand, one wants to know about the (characteristics of the) group of 
ore detailed results of the sensitivity analyses are available on request. 
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competitors a product faces, results appear quite robust. obustness of the 
results will in the final analysis depend on just what issue is being analyzed. 
6. Caveats 
We believe the methodology discussed in this paper is a valuable tool and 
can be profitably applied to many economic problems. owever, our analysis 
has a number of limitations. In this section we discuss r such limitations. 
First, when calculating surplus in (12) we have subtracted the predicted 
price from the hedonic regression (13) rather than the actual price. This 
means that we are treating the error term from the hedonic regression as 
reflecting only unmeasured characteristics of a model, which yield utility 
exactly equal to the dollar error. It follows that surplus is properly calculated 
as the utility from measured characteristics minus the predicted price, as 
in (12). 
An alternative approach we considered was to treat the error in the 
hedonic regression as reflecting pure price markups, with no unmeasured 
characteristics. In this case, actual rather than predicted prices are used in 
(12). However, this approach fails in practice, because we find that certain 
models with actual prices much greater than predicted prices are never 
purchased. That is to say, a grid search over 0 shows that every consumer 
would avoid the high prices of certain models, and choose another model 
with similar characteristics. In future research it would be desirable to 
assume that the errors in (13) reflect some combination of unmeasured 
characteristics and pure price markups. 
Secondly, because lmost preferred products lie on lines drawn between 
available products, the methodology may omit some models as competitors. 
In particular, it is unable to account for the preferences of consumers whose 
ideal product lies outside the convex hull of all available products.‘* This is 
unlikely to be a problem in a market with minimal entry barriers facing new 
products. Were there al high density of consumers in a part of characteristics 
space outside the convex hull of available models, such a market niche would 
likely be a profitable one. Given the actual absence of available models, we 
conclude that there are not likely to be many c sumers whose preferences 
lie outside the convex hull of available products. ile this caveat, then, may 
not apply to the automobile market with its d products, it may well 
apply to the super-computer market. 
Thirdly, we define tlhe competition without us’ any actual sa data. 
ather, we sirnp~y estimate a hedonic regression. are able to d e the 
competition in the absence of specific sales data by using a structural model 
“In fig. 2, the convex hull of available products is the triangle with vertices at A, 
Our met)r.>d fails to identify AL and B as competitors because the ideal product x lies outside the 
convex hL4. 
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in which estimated implicit prices of characteristics are interpreted as 
marginal utilities. By assuming a specific functional form, we are then able to 
obtain the utility function. The choice of the utility function is not 
innocuous. The CES functional fomr of (9) is often used in the characteristics 
approach to product differentiation, allows us to vary 6 for purposes of 
sensitivity analysis, and still yields an invertable first-order condition to (4).lg 
In current research we have obtained similar sets of competitors by using a 
quadratic surplus function in place of (12), but we have not yet experimented 
with other functional forms. 
Fourthly, our procedure is not conducive to formal hypothesis testing of 
which products are and which products are not competitors. Rather, the 
‘confidence’ one might place in the list of competitors is inv&gated by 
conducting sensitivity analyses. Because of this aspect of our method, 
sensitivity analyses seem essential. 
tential applications 
Product differentiation has recently been a much researched topic in the 
international trade and the industrial organization literatures. Almost all of 
this research has been theoretical. A wide range of these issues may be 
empirically investigated using, usually as a first step, the methodology 
described above. Levinsohn (1988) estimated an ad hoc demand system in 
which identification of competitors was used to impose cross-price elasticity 
zero restrictions. Work on estimating a utility consistent demand system for 
differentiated products as well as work estimating oligopoly pricing of 
differentiated products is in progress by the authors. 
Anti-trust analysis is often directed at ascertaining whether firm mergers 
will give rise to market power in a particular segment of the market. The 
answer often depends on how the market is defined. For example, whether 
one includes international competitors may affect the answer. The method of 
identifying the competition is a natural tool for the job. Similarly, one could 
easily investigate the dynamic competitive effects of government policies such 
as domestic taxes and subsidies, bail-outs, tariffs, and quotas by analyzing 
how competitors change over time in response to the policies. 
The methodology also has natural marketing applications. Given the 
characteristics of a potential entrant, it is straightforward to determine with 
which products the potential entrant would compete. 
These are but a few examples. The methodology presented in this paper is 
a first attempt at devising a much needed empirical tool. We hope the 
methodology will facilitate work in international trade, industrial organiza- 
19See also footnote 5. 
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tion, and public economics. We also hope others are stimulated to improve 
on the methodology itself. 
ata appendix 
The data used are from the 1987 Automotive News Market Data Book. The 
entire data set is available on floppy disk from the authors on request. 
Collected variables (and their units of measurement) are Overall Length 
(inches), Overall Width (inches), Overall Height (inches), Curb weight 
(pounds), Engine Displacement (cubic inches), Carburation (2 in fuel injected, 
1 otherwise), Net Horsepower, Net Torque (foot pounds), Power Steering (1 
if not standard, 2 if standard), Power Brakes (1 if not standard, 2 if 
standard), Air Conditioning (1 if not standard, 2 if standard), Foreign (1 if 
domestic, 2 if foreign), and List Price (dollars). For some but not all models, 
the EPA miles per gallon figures are reported. 
The source code of the FORTRAN 77 programs which implemented the 
identification of competitors and the sensitivity analyses are also available 
from the authors on request. 
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